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"FINLEY, FORBES AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT:
DOES HE WHO PAYS THE PIPER CALL THE
TUNE?"
JoelM. Gora*
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:

Our next speaker, Professor Joel Gora from Brooklyn Law
School, has been a consistent participant at these seminars. He is a
very valuable asset as well, since he is undoubtedly one of the
leading authorities in the country on the First Amendment. In
.addition to being a professor at Brooklyn Law School, he was the
former staff counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union and coauthor of a book entitled The Right to Protest.' So without further
ado, Professor Joel Gora.
Prof.Joel Gora:

Thank you, Judge Lazer. It is a pleasure to be back here again.
Actually, last year I was on sabbatical and was not able to
participate in the program. The Supreme Court, at least in terms of
the First Amendment, also took a sabbatical because the fewest
number of First Amendment cases were decided last year in my
memory. The Supreme Court addressed the First Amendment in
two cases last year and, in both of those cases, the First
Amendment claimants essentially lost their case.' This is a
reversal of the Court's normal batting average since First
Amendment claimants have done rather well in the past. That will
teach me to take a sabbatical!
These two cases, which I will discuss in some detail in a
moment, had a common, but not unfamiliar, theme - that is, under
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Former Associate Legal
Director, American Civil Liberties Union. General Counsel, New York Civil
Liberties Union.
1 GORA ET AL., THE RIGHT TO PROTEST

(Southern Illinois University Press,

1991).
2

Arkansas Educational Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633

(1998); National Endowment for the Arts v.Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
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the First Amendment,3 does he who pays the piper get to call the
tune? That issue, that aphorism, was present in both Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes and National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley. And the First Amendment
answer was basically, and disappointingly, yes.
The first case, Forbes, involved the field of government-owned
public television stations and concerned the broadcast of a political
debate among candidates. The issue in that case, in simplistic
terms, was when the government owns and controls the
microphone, does it get to decide who gets to use it, i.e. what
candidates will participate in a political debate and under what
circumstances they will participate?4
The other case, Finley, is more controversial and politically
divisive. Finley involved public funding of the arts.' The issue,
stated simply, is when the government is the patron of the arts,
does it also get to call the tune, or does the First Amendment have
something to say even when the government sponsors art?
This broad theme has been around for a long time - the
difference, if any, between the government as regulator or
prohibitor of speech on the one hand, versus the government as
facilitator, subsidizer, supporter or patron of speech on the other
hand. To what extent does First Amendment analysis differ when
the government is operating, not in a regulatory or prohibitory role,
but rather in what is occasionally called its proprietary capacity?
Finally, the common thread running through both these cases is the
core First Amendment rule against viewpoint discrimination which
holds that the government may not be permitted to discriminate
against ideas simply because it does not approve of those ideas.
The claim was made, or rather the issue was raised, in both
Finley and Forbes, that the exclusion of the speaker from the
government-sponsored forum had been based impermissibly on a
disagreement with the speaker's viewpoint. In other words, was
viewpoint discrimination present, and if so, is viewpoint
discrimination permissible when the government is writing a check

3 U.S. CONST. amend I (stating in pertinent part that "Congress shall make

no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .....
4 Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633.
5 Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168.
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to subsidize speech as opposed to writing a regulation to penalize
it.
The final theme that links both Finley and Forbes is that the
Court was aware of and very concerned with the practical
consequences of a robust First Amendment rule in this area namely, would the government, if told that it had to conduct this
patronage exercise consistent with normal, rigorous First
Amendment standards, simply throw up its hands and say it did not
want to be in the game at all. In both cases, as I will note in a
moment, the Court was concerned with whether the government
would retreat from funding the activity completely rather than be
made to comply with normal or rigorous First Amendment rules.
As a result, its doctrinal approach was far more instrumental than
theoretical or categorical.
The GreatDebateAbout Debates
Let me speak first of Forbes,6 the candidate debate case. This is
a quadrennial and perennial issue -- namely, debates among
candidates for office. We are all becoming familiar with the
presidential debates. The issue in Forbes was who may participate
in those political candidate debates when they are sponsored under
government auspices?
The same issue came up in an interesting manner in Perot v.
FederalElection Commission. The presidential debates between
Senator Dole and President Clinton were scheduled on October 6,
1996, when Ross Perot asked to join the officially-sponsored
debate between those presidential candidates.8 The Commission
on Presidential Debates [hereinafter "CPD"], the sponsor of the
debates,9 excluded Ross Perot on the grounds that he did not have
a real chance of winning the election."0
My friend, Ira Glasser, the head of the ACLU, commented in
response to the CPD's exclusion of Perot, that if the test were that
6

Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633.
F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub norn., Hagelin v. Federal

7 97

Election Comm'n, 117 S. Ct. 1692 (1997).
8 Id. at 556-57.
9 Id. at 555.
'0 Id. at 557.
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candidates who did not have a good chance of winning could be
left out, Senator Dole should have been excluded as well. That
would have left us with only Bill Clinton debating himself,
something he is all too good at doing.
The same issue came up in a less well-known setting in Forbes,
when a candidate named Ralph Forbes - no kin to Steve - sought to
join a debate among congressional candidates running for the
Third Congressional District in Arkansas." The debate was being
sponsored by the Arkansas Education Television Commission
[hereinafter "AETC"] a public television operation.12
The AETC was not a privately-owned "public broadcasting
station" like Channel 13 or Channel 21 with which we in the New
York area are familiar. Rather, it was a government-controlled
broadcasting network and operation that ran five noncommercial
educational-type television stations in the state of Arkansas. 3 The
program was under the sponsorship of a government agency. 4 The
government agency was engaged in First Amendment enterprises - namely, running television stations and broadcasting programs.
When the AETC denied Forbes a place in the debate, the issue
became the implications of the First Amendment on such a
decision. 5
Forbes went to court saying that his exclusion from that debate
violated the First Amendment. 6 He argued that he was a
respectable candidate - he received two thousand signatures in
order to be put on the ballot. 7 Moreover, in previous years, he had
run for Lieutenant Governor and received almost fifty percent of
the vote. 8 The court, however, categorized him in a pejorative and

11Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1637-38

(1998).
12 id.
13

Id. at 1637.

14 id .

161Id.
id.

at 1638.

17 Id.
18 Transcript

of Oral Argument, at *27, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n,

118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998) (No. 96-779), 1997 WL 664266 (noting that Forbes
received 46.98 percent of the votes in the Republican Primary for Lieutenant
Governor).
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dismissive way as a "perennial candidate," but I think he was, in
many respects, a very serious candidate.
The AETC, at various times during the litigation, proffered
different reasons for its decision to exclude Forbes from the
debate. At one point, it claimed he was excluded because he was
not a newsworthy candidate, or at least, it had determined he was
not a newsworthy candidate. 19 That excuse seemed to be a little
viewpoint-oriented.
Later on in the litigation, the AETC claimed that Forbes was
excluded because he did not have enough popular support?10
Forbes challenged the exclusion in court 2 The District Court
determined that just because the debate was on television, that did
not make it a public forum. The jury found that Forbes was
excluded, not because the AETC disagreed with his point of view,
but rather, because it decided he was not a serious candidate.
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that a public forum had
been created basically open to all legally-qualified candidates.2
The court noted that any such candidate should be allowed into the
forum and the exclusion of such a candidate had to be given strict
scrutiny.24 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Forbes. The AETC then appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court, which sets the stage for our issue.
In Forbes, the Supreme Court decided two basic issues. First,
whether a candidates' debate on a governmentally-owned and
operated public television station is a public forum. Second,
'9Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1638. The AETC stated that "[it] had made a bona
fide journalistic judgment that [their] viewers would be best served by limiting
the debate to the candidates already invited."
20 Id. (noting Forbes was excluded because "he lacked any campaign
organization, had not generated any appreciable voter support, and was not
regarded
as a serious candidate by the press covering the election.").
21
id.
22 Id. (noting "AETC's decision to exclude Forbes had not been influenced

by political pressure or disagreement with his views.").
23 Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 504 (8th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct.1633 (1998).
24 Forbes, 93 F.3d at 504-05 (noting that the AETC's assessment of Forbes
"political viability" was neither a "compelling nor [a] narrowly tailored" reason
to exclude him from the debate).
2 Id. at 504.
26 Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 117 S. Ct. 1243 (1997).
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whether the people who run that enterprise can claim their own
First Amendment editorial discretion as broadcast journalists to
determine what is newsworthy and not have the courts intervene
using the public forum doctrine.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, who in
recent years has normally been the Court's most reliable First
Amendment standard-bearer, ruled that public broadcasting is not a
public forum, since the hallmark of a public forum is the concept
of open access and viewpoint neutrality. 27 The Court continued
emphatically stating that such a concept flies in the face of, and is
"antithetical" to, the concept of journalism.28 Public broadcasters
are public, but they are also broadcasters and journalists. 29 The
Court essentially held that, just as private broadcasters cannot be
forced to open up their television stations, radio stations, or
networks to points of view with which they disagree, or a point of
view that someone claims is entitled to be aired, the same is true
for government-owned broadcasting companies? Putting together
public television programming, like putting together a cable
television network3' or putting together a parade3 2 are all activities
protected by the First Amendment, according to the Court.
So in a sense, I guess that there was a victory for the notion that
government public broadcasting facilities and networks are more
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1639
(1998) (noting that in the context of television broadcasting,"[b]road rights of
access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as a general rule, to the
discretion that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their
journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.").
27

28id.

Id. (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 110 (1973)) (explaining that "television broadcasters enjoy the 'widest
journalistic freedom consistent with their public responsibilities."').
30 Id. at 1640 (holding "the First Amendment of its own force does
not
compel public broadcasters to allow third parties access to their programming.").
3I See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994), reh'g
denied, 512 U.S. 1278 (1994) (stating "[t]here can be no disagreement on an
initial premise: cable programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit
speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions
of the First Amendment.").
32 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
Inc, 515 U.S. 557, 564 (1995) (explaining "the selection of contingents to make
a parade is entitled" to the protection of the First Amendment).
29
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broadcasters than they are government. Public television is more
television than public. Generally, the Court stated, there is no right
of access, under the First Amendment, to get yourself or your
views onto government-owned public stations." Nor, the Court
noted, did Congress provide so by writing any kind of statute
granting a right of access, although the Court left open the question
of whether such a statute might be acceptable under the First
Amendment.M
The Court's basic point was that the First Amendment does not
require this type of access to a publicly-owned television station. 5
The question of whether Congress might, at some point in time,
require such access was saved for another day.36
Having basically answered the broad question by saying that
public television is more a journalistic enterprise than a public
forum, the Court then had to address the more specific issue in the
case, namely, were candidate debates deemed to be an exception to
the hands-off approach.37 Here, the answer was yes, candidate
debates are
different and a rule of reasonable access may be
38
required
This other part of the Court's holding was that the rule of nonaccess really was different for candidate debates, because, in
effect, candidate debates are a kind of a public forum. " The Court
held off putting a precise label concerning the type of forum the
debates were until it engaged in its public forum analysis, stating
no more than that they were some type of exception to the previous
discussion in the case.41
The Court reiterated the basic rule: no public forum and
therefore, no right of access to publicly-owned and controlled
broadcasting facilities.
But where candidate debates are
33

Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1640.
Id. (stating the "legislative imposition of neutral rules for access to public
broadcasting" would not be barred by the First Amendment).
3S id.
3

36 rd.

37

38

Id. at 1640.

id.
Id. at 1640-41 (noting candidate debates are some type of forum).
40 Id. at 1640 (explaining "candidate debates present the narrow exception to
the rule"). See also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1973).
39
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concerned, the very nature of the debate, the fact that it is a place
for candidates to set forth their viewpoints, necessitates that doors
be left open for candidates to get their message out.41 Since
candidate debates have become vital to the electoral process,
neutrality is required.42 Public "broadcaster[s] cannot grant or deny
access to [candidates] on the basis of' disagreement with their
viewpoints. 3 Permitting broadcasters to do so would involve too
great a risk of "skewing" the electoral debate." So the question
becomes - if this is some kind of a forum, what kind of a forum is
it? 45
There are basically three choices under the taxonomy of the
public forum doctrine.46 One is a traditional, wide open public
forum such as streets and parks.47 The second choice is a
designated public forum, an area which is not intrinsically
designed for speech, but that the government sets aside for
speech.48 Public school classrooms used, after hours, for meetings
of off-campus groups are an example of the designated public
forum. 49 The third and final category is what is known as a non4' Forbes, 118
42

S. Ct. at 1640.
Id. (noting although not always "feasible for the broadcaster to allow

unlimited access to a candidate debate . . . the requirement of neutrality
remains.").
43 Id.
44 Id. (quoting Columbia, 412 U.S. at 125 (internal citation omitted)
(explaining that "[v]iewpoint discrimination in [the context of candidate
debates] would present not a '[c]alculated ris[k],' but an inevitability of skewing
the electoral dialogue.").
45 Id. at 1640-41 (stating "[t]he special characteristics of candidate debates
support the conclusion that the AETC debate was a forum of some type," but
now the question becomes "what type").
46 Id. at 1641 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
& Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (noting the "Court [has] identified three types of
fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government
designation, and the nonpublic forum.").
47 Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983) (explaining that "[t]raditional public fora are defined by the
objective characteristics of the property.").
48 Id. (stating "[d]esignated public fora . . . are created
by purposeful
governmental action.").
See also International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
49 See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 387 (1993).
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public forum -- a place where government, in effect, has opened its
doors for some, but not all, people who meet certain minimal
qualifications to speak."0
The Court concluded that, of those three possibilities, a debate
among candidates at a public broadcasting facility was a nonpublic forum.51 Such a forum would not be subject to the more
open access rules of designated public fora, since the broadcasters
are entitled to be selective concerning their choice of participants. 2
As long as the broadcasters do not make their selection on the basis
of viewpoint, and as long as the selection is based on reasonable,
non-viewpoint based criteria, then the decision to exclude Mr.
Forbes may be upheld on the grounds that it was not made based
on a disagreement with his views or a lack of regard for his views,
or a feeling that his views were controversial." Rather, it was
based on the more objective notion that his candidacy was not very
viable."
If I had to pick one fault with the Court's decision, it would be
the last point, since the contrary possible argument is that, in order
to make sure that no viewpoint discrimination exists, one must
insist upon a more objective standard to determine which
candidates will be permitted to participate. The shifting standards
that the AETC employed in Forbes really fly in the face of the
notion of an objective standard.
One objective standard could be: anybody who is on the ballot.
The concern with using that standard was, if all such debates had
to include all who were on the ballot, the debates would become
unruly and chaotic, a cacophony of sound." Thus, faced with the
choice of having to include all candidates or not having the debates
so Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641 (citing Krishna, 505 U.S. at 678-79 (stating

"[o]ther government properties are either nonpublic fora or not fora at all.").
5'Id.at 1641-43.
52 Id. at 1642 (explaining "[a] designated public forum is not created when
the government allows selective access for individual speakers rather than

general access for a class of speakers.").
53

Id. at 1643-44 (further citation omitted) (finding Forbes' exclusion was

"reasonable," not "based on 'objections or opposition to his views,"' but rather,
"because
he had generated no appreciable public interest.").
54
1d. at 1638.
51d. at 1643.
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at all, government broadcasters would choose the latter course, 6
and, the Court feared, the First Amendment would be the poorer
for the lack of debates.
It is easy to speculate that, because the Court was concerned
with the practical consequence of a more robust First Amendment
ruling, it decided to rule in favor of the broadcasters. As long as
there was no hint of viewpoint censorship, the broadcasters could
exclude candidates who seemed to not have much support. 7 But
again, the notion of "much support" seems like an awfully
subjective notion.
There was a dissent by Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Souter which basically stated that this was not a broadcast
case, it was a parade permit case.58 Justice Stevens explained that,
in this situation, you have the government deciding who gets to use
this very important forum to speak.59 The government, the dissent
explained, is doing so without any clear, objective, prior
announced standard.' This, the dissent states, is no different than a
police chief denying someone a parade permit to march down
Main Street for no other reason than they do not consider him a
serious candidate, or other similar subjective criteria along the
same line.6'
56

Id. (noting "[w]ere it faced with the prospect of cacophony, on the one

hand, and First Amendment liability, on the other, a public television
broadcaster might choose not to air candidates' views at all.").
57 Id. at 1644 (holding "AETC excluded Forbes because the voters lacked
interest in his candidacy, not because AETC itself did," and thus it "was a
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion consistent with
the First Amendment.").
58 Id. at 1647-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining "AETC's control was
comparable to that of a local government official authorized to issue permits to
use public facilities for expressive activities.").
9Id. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) (explaining "[t]here are no articulated
standards," no "objective factors" upon which the government might rely when
making its decision).
61 Id. at 1649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens then discussed
Forsyth County, 505 U.S. 123. Id. at 1648. He explained:
Perhaps the discretion of the AETC staff in controlling
access to the 1992 candidate debates was not quite as
unbridled as that of the Forsyth County administrator.
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The other concern of the dissenting Justices was that they
viewed the AETC as more public than broadcasting." The dissent
was concerned with the censorship potential inherent in allowing
the government to be in the business of journalism.3 If the
government were allowed to be in the business of journalism with
only a minimal amount of First Amendment scrutiny, the dissent

stated, then, in the long run, freedom of discussion could be in
danger, since the government might use its power for propaganda
purposes. 4

The dissent felt that the exclusion of Mr. Forbes from the debate
really dictated the outcome of the election.5 If Forbes had
participated and received a couple of thousand votes more
resulting from his participation in the debate, the outcome between

Nevertheless, it was surely broad enough to raise the concerns
that controlled our decision in that case. No written criteria
cabined the discretion of the AETC staff. Their subjective
judgment about a candidate's "viability" or "newsworthiness"
allowed them wide latitude either to permit or to exclude a
third participant in any debate. Moreover, in exercising that
judgment they were free to rely on factors that arguably
should favor inclusion as justifications for exclusion.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (further citation omitted).
62 Id. at 1646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the "Court seriously
underestimates the importance of the difference between private and public
ownership of broadcast facilities, despite the fact that Congress and this Court
have repeatedly recognized that difference.").
63d. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television
Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 505 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining the "AETC staff
members . . . 'were not ordinary journalists; they were employees of

government"').
64Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
Congress chose a system of private broadcasters licensed and
regulated by the Government, partly because of our traditional
respect for private enterprise, but more importantly because
public ownership created unacceptable risks of governmental
censorship and use of the media for propaganda.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 1645 (further citation omitted) (noting although AETC "may have
correctly concluded that Forbes 'was not a serious candidate,' their decision to
exclude him from the debate may have determined the outcome of the
election.").
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the two mainstream party candidates might have been very
different. 6
So, to the dissenters, Forbes was really a case of government
censorship. The dissent, while it would not have required that all
candidates who were on the ballot be permitted to participate in all
such debates, would have required a more objective standard of
inclusion and exclusion than the majority was willing to require.
Therefore, the net effect was a victory for public broadcasters in
the sense that public access principles basically do not apply.
These principles do apply, however, in the limited context of
candidate debates, but then only to be sure that government does
not engage in viewpoint discrimination when it picks and chooses
the debate participants.
And that is a loss for the First
Amendment. And it is a loss which has troubling implications for
other electoral issues as well, most notably, the exclusion of third
party and independent candidates from access to the ballot or
participation in public campaign fmance subsidies. Because of its
concern that requiring more speech would result in less speech, the
Court may have short-changed free speech.
The Eye of the Beholder
The other case I want to discuss, and I do it with a little
trepidation since Professor Friedman wrote a brief in that case and
knows more about it than I do, is National Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley.67 I think Finley is much more notorious, or at least the
issue that the case dealt with is much more notorious. Finley
involved government subsidization of the arts. Although there are
attitudinal similarities between the Finley case and the Forbes
case, there are methodological differences.
The Forbes case is sort of a classic case of categorization while
the Finley opinion is a classic case of minimization. What do I
mean by that? Well it is basically an opinion that minimizes the
doctrinal dispute in its attempt to decide the case without really
resolving the issues.

66id.
67

National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
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The Court in Forbes was concerned about the different
categories into which different kinds of speech and speakers could
be placed. The result was a clear, though arguably too restrictive,
set of guidelines to resolve both the general issues of the editorial
discretion of public broadcasting stations and the specific question
of candidate debates on public television. The message of the
Finley case, by contrast, seemed to be that the challenged statute
does not mean what it says, that neither government officials nor
affected artists pay much attention to it anyway, and therefore, why
worry about First Amendment concerns? But the problem is that
the issues raised by the Finley statute on arts funding have a much
broader application than the more focused question of candidate
debates on public television, and therefore the failure of the Court
to fashion clear guidelines in Finley may come back to haunt it.
On the other hand, the resulting ambiguity, coupled with the
Court's acknowledgement that even arts funding decisions by
government are subject to some First Amendment controls, may
have been the best result that the anti-censorship forces could
achieve.
The statute in Finley was passed in response to some notorious
episodes involving art that was funded under federal sponsorship.'
One such episode was an exhibit of homoerotic photographs, taken
by the late artist Robert Mapplethorpe, that were on display at the
University of Pennsylvania under a grant from the National
Endowment for the Arts.69 At the same time, a provocative work
of art involving a crucifix submerged in a jar of urine was also
subsidized by National Endowment for the Arts' [hereinafter
"NEA"] funds, and that particular subsidy gave rise to an
enormous amount of political pressure as well."
In Forbes, had the government been forced to live with strict
First Amendment rules when it set up a debate, it might not have
68

Id. at 2172 (noting "[t]wo provocative works

revaluation of the NEA's funding priorities.").

. . .

led to congressional

Id. (explaining that a $30,000 dollar grant received from the NEA was
used by the Institute of Contemporary Art at the University of Pennsylvania "to
fund a 1989 retrospective of photographer Robert Mapplethorpe's work.").
70 Id. Members of Congress "denounced artist Andres Serrano's work Piss
Christ, a photograph of a crucifix immersed in urine." Id. The artist had
received a "$15,000 grant from the Southeast Center for Contemporary Art," an
69

organization funded by the NEA. Id.
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scheduled one. There was a similar problem in Finley concerning
the government subsidization of the arts since, many felt, if the
government could not pick and choose which artist would get its
funding and which artist would get its patronage, then the
government was not about to fund the arts at all. Indeed, one of
the solutions proposed to this dilemma during the debate over the
NEA statute was an effort to defund the NEA and not fund the arts
at all."
The statute that eventually emerged was a legislative
The statute stated that, in determining or
compromise.
considering grants, or applications for grants under the statute,
both artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which
applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards
of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public." That latter provision was added to the statute
when it was amended,74 and then was challenged by a number of
artists who engage in provocative works and who were in danger
of losing grants because their works did not fit the test.75
The lower courts agreed that the statute meant what it said. It
was designed to discourage, if not disallow, art grants to people
whose art did not show proper decency and respect.7 Certainly,
that was viewpoint discrimination with a vengeance, and even
though it was a funding program, it was still subject to serious First
Amendment restraint.

71
72

Id. at 2170-74.

Id. at 2173 (explaining that "[u]ltimately, Congress adopted . . . a

bipartisan compromise between Members opposing any funding restrictions and
those favoring some guidance to the agency.").
73 Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990)).
74 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
75 Id. at 2164. The artists challenging the provision were Karen Finley, Joln
Fleck, Holly Hughes, and Tim Miller. Id. They had applied for grants before
was amended. Id.
the 7statute
6
Id. at 2174-75.
77 id.

Id. at 2174 (quoting Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F.
Supp. 1457, 1476 (C.D. Cal. 1992), rev'd, 524 U.S. 569 (1998)) (stating "the
First Amendment constrains the NEA's grant-making process, and that because
§ 954(d)(1) 'clearly reaches a substantial amount of protected speech,' it is
impermissibly overbroad on its face.").
78
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Well, the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice O'Connor
speaking for six Justices, including Justices Ginsburg and Stevens
who had dissented in the Forbesopinion, essentially held that there
was no harm, no foul.79 This opinion was almost a type of judicial
Jujitsu, since the claim that the statute was so vague and uncertain
and therefore would have a chilling effect on artists, was used to
deflect the claim that the statute would keep provocative art from
being funded.
Essentially, the Court stated the statute did not mean what it said.
The standards of decency and respect were viewed primarily as
only hortatory considerations, not mandates, with the Court's
expressing doubt that any one particular work of art would be
denied funding because it failed to meet those standards.M So, for
that reason, in essence, we do not have to even determine the tough
issues of viewpoint discrimination because we are not sure the
statute is engaged in a mission of viewpoint discrimination. 8'
Thus, the Court sustained the statute.2
Some First Amendment advocates, maybe Professor Friedman
included, would agree with that and say that the First Amendment
did not suffer a big loss since the sting was taken out of the statute
by saying it was hortatory, precatory and not regulatory. But
certainly, on the other hand, it was not a very broad decision in
favor of First Amendment claims saying that, even when the
government is doling out its funds, First Amendment safeguards
have to be honored. Well, two final thoughts and then I will sit
down.
There was a concurrence written by Justices Scalia and
Thomas.83 It was the exact opposite, methodologically, of Justice
O'Connor's opinion. It was a rootin', tootin', rip-snorting opinion
which said two things. Number one, the statute means what it
79 Id. at 2176 (noting that the statute "does not introduce considerations

that... would effectively preclude or punish the expression of particular
views," and thus, no "directed viewpoint discrimination" exists).
80 Id. at 2176-77 (stating "we do not perceive a realistic danger that §

954(d)(1) will compromise First Amendment values.").
"' Id. at 2176.

Id. at 2180 (holding the statute "merely adds some imprecise
considerations to an already subjective selection process" and "does not, on its
face, impermissibly infringe on' First Amendment protections).
83
Id. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82
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says.84 It was precisely designed to disfavor and withhold funds
from points of view that involved lack of decency or lack of
respect for American values.85 Number two, that it is perfectly
constitutional.86
The rationale behind the concurrence's statements was if you
look at the text of the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech,"8 7 abridging means
prohibiting, putting in jail, or regulating -- it does not mean not
funding.88 So the concurrence's point of view was that funding
decisions are almost never subject to First Amendment quarrels
since they involve other than abridging freedom of speech.89
There was only one dissent on the merits, and that was written
by Justice Souter.
Justice Souter stated that the statute was
intended to discourage art from being funded if it had a certain
point of view, noting that even if such a point of view was
obnoxious, it is protected by the First Amendment. Justice Souter
explained that a government decision to penalize certain unpopular
points of view by withholding funding for them would be just as
subject to First Amendment scrutiny as decisions putting people in
84 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (dramatically stating "THE STATUTE MEANS
WHAT IT SAYS.").

85 Id. at 2181-82 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia explained that the
statute "constitutes viewpoint discrimination," and that "it is perfectly clear that
[it] was meant to disfavor - that is, to discriminate against, unfavorable [artistic]
productions." Id.
86

Id. at 2182 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting dramatically, in all capital

letters,
that "WHAT THE STATUTE SAYS IS CONSTITUTIONAL.").
87 Id.
at 2182 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONST. amend I).
88 Id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, in his concurrence
explained:

The nub of the difference between me and the Court is that
I regard the distinction between 'abridging' speech and

funding it as a fundamental divide, on this side on which the
First Amendment is inapplicable. The Court, by contrast,
seems to believe that the First Amendment, despite its words,
has some ineffable effect upon funding, imposing constraints
of an indeterminate nature which it announces (without
troubling to enunciate any particular test) are not violated by
the quite different, emasculated statute that it imagines.
Id. (Scalia,
J., concurring).
8
9See

supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
S.Ct. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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jail for their art.9 ' Justice Souter noted that this was a classic case
of viewpoint discrimination, albeit in the form of funding rather
than prohibition, and thus, should be subject to First Amendment
standards.92
So there it is, a short and semi-sweet, First Amendment term.
Despite their methodological differences, Forbes and Finley sound
common themes. First the government was ceded broad authority
to choose which speakers could use its public television facilities
and could receive its artistic subsidies. Content-based distinctions
and choices among speakers and speech seeking government
patronage would be permissible, so long as they did not degenerate
into viewpoint-based censorship of particular ideas. Second, the
Court seemed animated by the pragmatic concern that if
government were not allowed to make those choices where its
microphone and its checkbook were involved, it would turn off
that mike and close that checkbook, and political and artistic
expression would be the poorer as a result of that choice. I would
have rather held the government's feet to the First Amendment
fire, to make governnent have to choose between forgoing
programs it values and implementing those programs in a manner
consistent with robust free speech rights. Let the First Amendment
call the tune.
The Court's answer, however, to the question, does he who pays
the piper get to call the tunes was, for the most part, yes, even
under the First Amendment. However, when there is clear

91Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414
(1989) (noting "'[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.'").
92Id. at 2191 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that "as long as
Congress chooses to subsidize expressive endeavors at large, it has no business
requiring the NEA to turn down funding applications of artists and exhibitors
who devote their 'freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry' to defying our
tastes, our beliefs, or our values." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter
continued, noting that Congress "'may not use the NEA's purse to
'suppres[s] ...dangerous ideas."' Id. at 2191-92 (Souter, J.,dissenting)
(quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)
(internal quotation omitted)).

982

TOUROLAWREVIEW

[Vol 15

evidence that the tune is being called for viewpoint censorship
reasons, then the result may be otherwise. Thank you very much.

